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ALBERT E. BURGER
HE U.S. economy was subjected to severe strains
during the first half of 1980. Beginning in the fall
of 1979, the growth of the money stock (M1B)
slowed substantially and then declined sharply for
three months in early 1980. The price of oil was
raised substantially late in 1979, and a major selec-
tive credit restraint program was introduced early in
1980. Prices rose sharply, and the long-expected re-
cession occurred with severe effects on specific sec-
tors of the economy, such as autos and housing. In
the space of a few months, interest rates soared to
record high levels and then plunged as quickly. As
market interest rates climbed above Regulation Q
ceiling rates and rates set by state usury laws, finan-
cial institutions experienced difficulties in holding and
acquiring funds and, hence, in performing their tra-
ditional roles in the financial system.
When major economic developments occur so rap-
idly, it is difficult to isolate the basic forces that are
driving the economy. Explanations that seem reason-
able one week are apparently negated by develop-
ments that occur a few weeks later. Now that the
first half of 1980 is history, it is possible to present
a coherent explanation of economic developments that
arose during this period, especially in regard to the
role of monetary actions.
Such an explanation requires more than a simple
listing of economic events; it demands a framework of
analysis that ties diverse economic events together
and relates them to policy actions. The first section
of this article presents such a framework.
A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
The analytical framework presented in this section
relates inflation and changes in the growth of real
output to monetary developments. To explain eco-
nomic events that have occurred thus far in 1980 as
simply as possible, the analysis is presented in sum-
mary form and various relationships are illustrated
through the use of charts and tables.
Money and inflation
Inflation refers to persistent increases in prices.
Prices denote the rate of exchange between money
and various goods and services. Consequently, an
analysis of inflation must consider the rate of growth
of (1) the amount of money available to the public,
(2) the amount of money the public is willing to
hold relative to total spending, and (3) the amount
of goods and services available to the public (real
output). The long-mn or trend growth of real out-
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put is determined by such factors as the growth and
quality of the labor force, capital formation, technol-
ogy, availability of natural resources, etc. This trend
rate of growth in real output is essentially unaffected
by monetary developments.’
The trend rate of price increases, for a given growth
of real output, depends on the rate of growth of the
money stock and the willingness of the public to hold
money relative to growth in total spending. Conse-
quently, inflation is frequently referred to as a mone-
tary phenomenon. If the rate of growth of the stock
of money exceeds the rate at which individuals are
willing to increase their holdings of money, they will
attempt to eliminate their excess money balances,
and prices will be driven up. In the United States,
the long-mn or persistent rate of increase in prices
bas approximated the trend rate of growth of the
money stock, as shown in chart 1. When the money
stock increased at less than a2percent rate for a
‘As the rate of inflation has risen rapidly, relative to past U.S.
experience, the complete independence of the trend growth of
real output and growth of money has been called into ques-
tion, See Keith M. Carlson, “Money, InflatIon, and Economic
Growth: Some Updated Reduced Form Results and Their
Implications,” this Review (April 1980), pp. 13-19.
prolonged period, as from the middle 1950s to the
early l960s, inflation rose at less than a2percent
rate. When the trend growth of money moved up-
ward, so did inflation. Since the early 1960s, the long-
run average rate of increase in prices has slowed only
once — from early 1973 through 1977 — when the
trend rate of money growth also slowed.
Viewing inflation in this long-term monetary con-
text provides a consistent explanation of the average
rate of inflation over the past nine years. From IV/70-
IV/79, money grew on average at a 6.7 percent an-
nual rate and inflation averaged 7 percent, as shown
in table 1
However, examination of the data in table 1 reveals
sub-periods within the last nine years in which there
were wide differences between the growth of money
and inflation, including several periods in which
money growth slowed substantially while inflation
accelerated. These circumstances can be explained
within the framework of analysis by showing (1)
connections between short-run variations in the
growth of money and the growth in real output,
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Chart 2
Rates of Change of Money Stock (MiB)
1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980
Shaded areas represent periods aS I,us,nes’ recessions.
~T~-~a-quaner rate at change
4
data prior to 3rd quarter 1959 are Ml.
~Twenty.quarter rate at change; data prior to 1st quarter 964 are Ml.
latest data platted: 3rd quarter
Table 1
Growth Rates of Money, Prices,
and Real Output
Real
Persod Money Prices output
IV.’70- li’73 7.7% 46% 63%
1/73 - 1/74 5.3 8.2 0.0
1/74 - 1/75 3.7 11.6 4.8
175 - 111/76 5.5 5.4 5.9
111/76 - IV/78 8.1 7.1 5.0
IV/78 - 111/79 8.5 9.1 0.6
III-’79 - 11/80 2.9 9.4 2.6
111/79 - 1,80 5.6 8.9 1.6
/80- lI’SO -2.3 10.6 9.0
V/b - IV/79 6.7 7.0 3.3
Money and Real Output
Although changes in the trend growth rate of
money have virtually no effect on the trend growth
of real output, short-run fluctuations in money growth
do affect the short-mn growth in real output. Pro-
ducers do not immediately adjust prices to changes
in the demand for goods and services that occur when
the public attempts to adjust the amount of money
held to the amount they desire to hold, given income
and interest rates. Consequently, real output bears
the initial bmnt of the effects of the public’s adjust-
ments to a substantial change in the rate of growth
of their money holdings.
Fluctuations in short-run money growth relative to
trend money growth offer an abridged way of illus-
trating the severity of short-mn monetary develop-
ments.2 Chart 2 depicts two-quarter growth rates of
money relative to a 20-quarter trend. In the past,
each time short-run money growth has fallen substan-
tially below trend, output has slowed substantially,
many times by an amount large enough to classify
that period as a recession.3 In addition, the accelera-
tion of short-run money growth typically provides a
temporary impetus to real output growth that moves
it above trend. For example, the short-mn growth of
2
For an alternative way of representing monetary acceleration
and deceleration, see William Poole, “The Relationship of
Monetary Deceleration to Business Cycle Peaks: Another Look
at the Evidence,” Journal of Finance (June 1975), pp. 697-712.
:lAlthough not classified as a full recession, the 1966-67 period
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I
money was substantially above trend in 1977 and
1978, as shown in chart 2. Table 1 indicates that real
output grew by more than 5 percent during this pe-
riod, substantially more than any prevailing estimates
of the rate that could be maintained over a prolonged
period of time. The growth of real output eventually
had to return to the rate dictated by labor force
growth, capital formation, etc., even if the monetary
stimulus remained very strong.
Monetary Policy Objectives and
Growth of Money
The primary long-mn objectives of monetary policy
are to avoid inflation and to encourage growth of real
output. When inflation is low and real output is
growing at what policymakers consider “an acceptable
rate,” these two objectives do not conflict. When real
output growth is “too low” or inflation “too high,”
however, these two goals can conflict especially in
the short mn.
Real output growth can be temporarily accelerated
above its trend rate by increasing the degree of mone-
tary stimulus. However, if such a policy action is
maintained, greater inflation results, which violates
the other objective of monetary policy. On the other
hand, reducing inflation that is the result of past pol-
icy actions (the monetary rate of inflation) is a long-
term proposition requiring a reduction in the trend
growth of money. If policy actions sharply reduce
the growth of money in the short term, inflation is
not affected, but the growth of real output will de-
cline and the economy may slide into a recession.
Consequently, at times when either of the major pol-
icy goals is not being met, the Federal Reserve must
design its policy actions carefully and enforce them
consistently to avoid violating the other policy goal.
Supply-Side Effects, Real Output,
and Inflation
Growth of real output can drop suddenly and tem-
porarily for reasons unrelated to decelerated money
growth. Supply-side shocks, such as droughts, floods,
reduction in the supply of a basic factor input such
as oil, or an unexpected sharp rise in the relative price
of a factor input, can cause sharp declines in real
output.4 If money continues to grow at the same rate
4
See Robert H. Rasche and John A. Tatorn, “The Effects of the
New Energy Regime and Economic Capacity, Production, arid
Prices,” this Review (May 1977), pp. 2-12.
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that prevailed prior to the supply shock, prices must
rise. As the level of prices adjusts upward, inflation
soars above the rate dictated by the trend rate of
monetary expansion. However, unless the rate of
growth of money also accelerates, inflation returns to
the rate dictated by the trend growth of money, after
the level of prices has adjusted.
Since 1972, the major supply-side shocks affecting
the economy have resulted from developments in the
energy industry. The periodic sharp increases in
energy prices relative to output prices have reduced
the productivity of the existing capital stock and labor
and, hence, have reduced output. The consequences
have been periodic sharp rises in the level of prices
and reductions in the growth of real output, as oc-
cuned in 1973-74 and 1979.~
Monetary Policy Objectives and
Supply-Side Effects
Since supply-side effects definitely influence the
measured growth of real output and inflation, they
can obscure the ongoing effects of monetary develop-
ments on these variables. During the transition pe-
riod in which the economy adjusts to supply-side
shocks, it is important to keep in mind what mone-
tary policy actions can and cannot do in relation to
realoutput and inflation. Monetary policy actions can
create more money; they cannot create more oil,
grain, cattle, or any other real good or service. The
sharp rise in the level of prices accompanying supply-
side shocks simply reflects the way a market econ-
omy eliminates the shortage of any good. The surge
in prices does not represent a rise in the lasting rate
of inflation; that rate is still being determined by the
cumulative effects of past policy actions on the trend
growth of money. Once the level adjustment of prices
is completed, the measured rate of inflation slows.
This pattern of price movements does not reflect
monetary policy actions, but simply indicates that the
rate of increase of prices is returning to the rate dic-
tated by monetary expansion.°Attempts to offset the
effects of supply-side shocks on real output by sharply
accelerating the growth of money only cause prices
to rise further.
5See Denis S. Karrsosky, “The Link Between Money and Prices
— 1971-76,” this Review (June 1976), pp. 17-23.
6
See Albert E. Burger, “Is Inflation All Due to Money?” this
Review (December 1978), pp. 8-12.FEDERAL RESERVE SANK OF ST. LOUIS AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1980
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Relative Price of Energy*
ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST HALF OF 1980
The two major forces affecting the economy in the
first half of 1980 were a major change in the growth
of the money stock and a continuation of the supply-
side effects of increased energy prices. These two
forces both operated to depress real output growth.
The monetary developments had little initial effect on
reducing the basic monetary rate of inflation, while
developments in the energy markets served to raise
the level of prices and push the measured rate of
price increases considerably above the rate of infla-
tion dictated by the long-term growth in money.
Supply-Side Effects
In early 1980, as in 1979, real output growth con-
tinued to be restrained by the large ongoing rise in
the relative price of energy. The composite refiner
acquisition cost of cmde oil rose from $12.93 per
barrel in December 1978 to $27.85 per barrel in May
1980. This increase is reflected in the sharp rise in
energy prices relative to output prices, as shown in
chart 3. This rise in the relative price of energy, which
was approximately the same as that in 1973-74, was
the primary cause of the drop in real output growth
from 4.8 percent in 1978 to 1 percent in 1979.” Its
effects continued into 1980, constraining real output
growth to a 1 - 2 percent rate.
The impact of the sharp rise in energy prices was
not distributed equally across all sectors of the econ-
omy, but was most severe for those industries and
products which were heavy users of energy, such as
automobiles. As shown in chart 4, the relative price
of gasoline rose sharply from the end of 1978 through
1980. The retail price of gasoline rose from about 70
cents a gallon at the end of 1978 to $1.22 per gallon
“See Keith M. Carison, “Explaining the Slowdown of 1979: A
Supply and Demand Approach,” this Review (October 1979),
pp. 15-22.
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in April 1980. For someone that owned an auto that
averaged 10-12 miles per gallon, this rise in the retail
price of gasoline increased his annual expenditure on
gasoline by about $700-$800. This development trig-
gered a general decrease in demand for autos and a
shift in preference toward more fuel-efficient imported
autos. Consequently, retail sales of domestically pro-
duced passenger cars fell dramatically from a rate of
about 9 million units at the end of 1978 to a rate of
about 7.5 million units at the end of 1979 and then
plummeted to a rate of 5.2 million units in May and
June of 1980.
Credit Market Developments
Housing was the other sector of the economy that
suffered most severely from developments in the first
half of 1980. Housing starts fell from an annual rate
of about 1.5 million units at the end of 1979 to an
annual rate of approximately 900,000 units in May
1980. The collapse in activity in this market was due
primarily to a sharp rise in mortgage costs and greatly
reduced availability of mortgage credit. For example,
mortgage rates rose from 10.5 percent in April 1979
to 12.9 percent in late 1979 and, finally, to 16.3 per-
cent in April 1980.
The demand for credit, especially short-term credit,
surged during the early months of 1980. In January
and February, for example, business loans at com-
mercial banks increased at a 24 percent rate, after
rising at only a 6.6 percent rate over the previous
three months. Part of this large increase in credit de-
mand resulted from anticipations of a program of
selective credit controls. Borrowing that would ordi-
narily have taken place later in the spring took place
early in the year, because potential borrowers were
uncertain about their ability to acquire funds at a
later date. Consequently, as the Federal Reserve
sought to constrain the resulting explosion in money
and credit, short-term interest rates soared upward by
3 to 4 percentage points in the span of about two
months. The rise in market interest rates resulted in
a rapid outflow of savings deposits, which forced sav-
ings and loans to hold and acquire deposits by issu-
ing money market certificates that bore much higher
interest rates than passbook savings. At the same time,
savings and loans were frequently constrained on the
mortgage rates they could charge dne to ceilings set
by usury laws. The consequent sharp rise in mortgage
rates and reduced credit flow to the housing market
led to the severe drop in housing construction that
occurred in early 1980.
Monetary Developments
Even if monetary stimulus had continued at the
rate that prevailed during most of 1979, the combined
effects of the adjustment of the economy to oil price
increases, the resulting special structural problems in
the auto industry, and the special credit market de-
velopments affecting housing would have resulted in
a decline in real output in the first half of 1980. How-
ever, the degree of monetary stimulus (as measured
by growth of money) did change substantially during
this period. In October 1979, the growth of M1B be-
gan slowing. From October 1979 to February 1980,
growth of M1B averaged about 6 percent, compared
to its 8.3 percent rate of growth over the first nine
months of 1979. If this reduction in the growth rate of
money had continued, it would have exerted a mod-
erate restraining effect on real output growth, adding
to the downward pressures being exerted by those
factors mentioned above.
Beginning in March of this year, however, mone-
tary stimulus moved from moderately restrictive to
very restrictive. For three months, March-May, the
money stock declined at an annual rate of approxi-
mately 5 percent. Chart 2 helps place this recent
reduction in money growth in historical perspective.
It shows that the slower than average money growth
from September through February was rapidly pull-
ing money growth in line with its trend rate. The fol-
lowing three-month decline in M1B, combined with
the previous slowing, plunged it far below its trend
rate. As shown in chart 2, when the growth of money
slowed so abruptly in the past, real output and em-
ployment likewise slowed substantially. In line with
this past experience, industrial production fell very
sharply after February, growth of employment came
to a halt and then declined sharply, and the unem-
ployment rate rose from about 6 percent early in the
year to 7.7 percent in May.
Was the First Half of 1980 Unique?
The events that took place in the first six months
of 1980 are not unique, but have become all-too-fre-
quent occurrences. In many aspects, the period from
111/79-11/80 represents a compressed version of what
occurred in the 1973-74 period.9 In both periods, the
economy was forced to adjust to oil price shocks
that resulted in special problems for autos; at the
same time, soaring interest rates created special prob-
8
See Norman N. Bowsher, “Two Stages to the Current Reces-
sion,” this Review (June 1975), pp. 2-8.
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lems for housing. Monetary developments were also
analogous in both periods, although they were some-
what more extended in 1973-74 than in the most re-
cent period. The behavior of real output, employment,
and prices was also strikingly similar in both periods.
Consequently, a brief comparison of what happened
recently to real output, employment, and prices with
what happened to these same variables in 1973-74
adds to our understanding of the economic events
that occurred in the first half of 1980.
Although real growth and employment slowed in
1973 and early 1974, these variables did not evidence
a sharp decline until monetary stimulus moved from
moderately restrictive to sharply restrictive (1/74-
1/75). Prices also behaved similarly in both periods.
In 1973-74, as in the three-quarter period ended 11/80,
prices soared upward, even though the degree of
short-run monetary stimulus was markedly reduced.
The behavior of the economy in the first half of
1980 further illustrates that excessive short-run fluctu-
ations in the growth of money in either direction have
serious economic implications. In the situation that
prevailed from late 1976 through late 1979, sharp ac-
celerations in money growth increased the trend rate
of money growth and, hence, were inconsistent with
a policy objective of reducing inflation. Since late 1979,
a sharp deceleration in money growth, combined with
supply-side effects that adversely affected real output,
caused a severe slowdown in real output. Slow money
growth over the three-quarter period ending TI/SO
reduced the trend growth of money (the 16- to 20-
quarter average) by only about 0.5 percent. Although
the monetary deceleration had only a minimal effect
on inflation, the effect on the growth of real out-
put was large. Consequently, economic events in the
last three quarters further support the proposition
that pronounced fluctuations of money growth are
inconsistent with a policy aimed at progressively re-
ducing inflation while minimizing the contraetionaiy
effects on real output.
What Will Happen Now?
Interpreting what happened to the economy after
1974 is helpful because it gives some indication of
what effects alternative monetary developments might
have on the economy. The recovery in real output that
began in 1975 did not require a very large monetary
stimulus. From 1/75 to 111/76, growth of M1B
averaged 5.5 percent. Real output grew at a rapid
pace of 7.5 percent for a year, then slowed to a rate
of 3 percent, which was in line with the long-run
potential growth rate of real output. Growth of em-
ployment was renewed in early 1975 and the un-
employment rate began to decline, falling from a
peak rate of 9 percent in mid-1975 to 7.5 percent
by the end of 1976.
The sharp surge in the growth of money that
started in late 1976 stimulated a renewed growth of
real output that lasted through 1978, with real growth
averaging 4.6 percent. However, after 1978, con-
tinued monetary stimulus was no longer able to
sustain real growth above its long-run potential.
It is also instructive to note that the surge in in-
flation in 1973-74 that was caused by supply-side
shocks to the economy did not last. The economy
adjusted to a new higher level of prices, absorbing
the energy price increases. Since the growth of money
continued at a reduced rate, the rate of inflation fell
below a 6 percent rate and this rate was maintained
over the next year and a half. Only when the trend
rate of growth of money was substantially raised as
a result of the persistent 8 percent growth of money
that began in late 1976 did inflation again surge
upward.
Since May, there has been a very substantial in-
crease in the money stock, offsetting the sharp decline
that occurred earlier this year. Such a sharp reversal
in the degree of monetary stimulus should act to
correct the effects on real output of the earlier de-
cline in money. Consequently, the recent growth of
money is consistent with a policy objective of gradu-
ally reducing inflation subject to the constraint of
not inducing a deep and prolonged recession.
The recent rapid growth of money will become
inconsistent with both policy objectives if it is main-
tained for any prolonged period of time. Most econ-
omists expect real growth to remain slow for the
next few quarters, as the economy continues to ad-
just to oil price increases and as special structural
problems persist in the automobile and housing in-
dustries. Maintaining rapid money growth under these
circumstances will add little to real output growth,
but will erode the small gains that were made against
inflation as a result of the three-quarter reduction in
money growth from 111/79 to TI/SO.
15